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Nearly three decades ago Congress overturned a veto by President Nixon and passed the War Powers Resolution of
1973. Supporters of the resolution took heart that Congress was, at last, challenging the increasingly unilateral exercise
of presidential power in matters of war and peace. The most enthusiastic proponents of the resolution believed that it
would reinvigorate a legislative branch which, through a half-century of depression, world war, and nuclear anxiety,
had gradually ceded many of its constitutional prerogatives to an executive branch willing to take them on as its own.
The Vietnam War had marked the nadir of congressional influence in foreign affairs. While few blamed Congress
directly for involving the nation in that war, the conflict had highlighted the growing irrelevance of the first branch of
government in foreign policy matters. The War Powers Resolution (also commonly called the War Powers Act) was
supposed to change all that. Congress would no longer be satisfied with nipping at the heels of the leviathan as it strode
uninterrupted toward an era of the "imperial presidency." It would stand as a full constitutional partner of the President
and presumably ensure that future military interventions, because of the shared institutional responsibility, would be
more rare, more consensual, and therefore more legitimate.
After almost 30 years and dozens of instances involving the use of the US military in hostile settings, how has the War
Powers Resolution fared as way to bring about collective judgment and renew the participation of Congress in matters
of military conflict? Have the requirements and mechanisms of the resolution fulfilled the intent of the Constitution?
What results have been brought about by this decisionmaking framework? And were these the intended results?
The four requirements of the War Powers Resolution were intended to promote collective judgment when the nation
was faced with issues of war or potential hostilities and to provide procedural mechanisms that would be activated in
case of presidential noncompliance.[1] The resolution envisioned a sequence of events when military action was
contemplated. First, a requirement for the President to consult with Congress would alert the latter that force had been
used or was expected in a given context. Second, the specific reasons for the action and the justifications for it were to
be provided to Congress through a report from the President. Whenever possible, the President was to make this report
within 48 hours of taking any action or making a tactical decision, thus starting the "clock" for Congress.[2] Third,
Congress would have 60 days to debate the President's action and decide on its legitimacy and legality. However, if
Congress did not make any decisions or take action--even, in fact, if Congress ignored the issue for two months--there
were still to be consequences. If no express authorization of presidential action were forthcoming, the military forces
would have to be withdrawn at the end of 60 days, though the President might submit a request for a 30-day extension
of this deadline. Fourth, Congress retained the power, through the passage of a concurrent resolution, to direct the
President to remove military forces at any time during the 60-day period.[3]
Using the text of the War Powers Resolution and three important military engagements in the 1980s and 1990s, this
article will evaluate the following three areas of concern: communication, and its implications for conducting policy
involving the use of force; timing, both as it touches domestic debate and foreign actions; and the representative
mandate of Congress, which should be at the core of any evaluation of the law.
The Persian Gulf, 1987: Procedural Mechanisms and Stubborn Realities
Looking at the history that preceded the passage of the War Powers Resolution and the intent of its framers, the
communication requirement of consultation and reporting envisions only two parties: Congress and the President. The
consultation provision sought to balance the need of the President for secrecy and unity in tactical command with the

need of Congress to debate, seek consensus, and provide authorization. This is the only requirement before the
initiation of hostilities, yet its language stops short of providing the President with a pre-authorization for use of force.
Section 3 reads:
The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress
until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such
situations.[4]
Nevertheless, the 27-year history of the consultation requirement has been one of presidential lip-service and
congressional acquiescence. During a June 1995 House debate over legislation to repeal the War Powers Resolution,
one Representative noted that there had been 40 incidents since passage of the resolution in which there had been an
identifiable consultation between the President and Congress over uses of force in foreign settings. The record of
presidential communication had been extensive. However, it was also noted that these communications, for the most
part, had been presidential exercises in telling the Congress what had been already decided and done, not invitations
for Congress to join in the decisionmaking process.[5] The Representative's conclusion was that the consultation
requirement, by itself, did little to inhibit presidents from unilaterally deploying armed forces into hostile settings.
The consultation requirement is coupled with the reporting requirement. As a legislative interpretation of the
Constitution, the framers of the War Powers Resolution conceded that not all uses of force fell neatly into the
declaration-of-war clause. Section 4 states:
In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which the United States Armed Forces are
introduced . . . the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth-{A} the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;
{B} the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place;
{C} the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.[6]
Other subsections require that reporting be done regularly and be provided upon request to the Congress should
hostilities persist.
There have been a number of criticisms of the 48-hour reporting requirement. One writer observed, "It takes little
ingenuity to imagine that the President might be occupied during the first 48 hours of hostilities with his
responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief, into which zone of responsibility Congress may not intrude."[7] Presidents
have not ignored the reporting requirement as much as they have redirected it, using it to their best advantage. Instead
of formally reporting to Congress, presidents have "gone public," reporting directly to the people, hoping to both
promote and justify their actions.
One of the problems surrounding both the consultation and reporting requirements has been identifying the
circumstances that activate them. For example, in March 1987 President Ronald Reagan ordered the military into the
Persian Gulf. Two months later, the U.S.S. Stark was on patrol in international waters in the Gulf when an Iraqi F-1
Mirage, proceeding south along the Saudi Arabian coast, suddenly turned east, heading toward the Stark. As warnings
were broadcast, the Mirage fired two Exocet air-to-surface missiles. Both hit the Stark, killing 37 sailors. The Stark did
not return fire, either in its own defense or in retaliation for the attack. Months later, in September, US forces attacked
an Iranian naval landing craft, the Iran Ajr. For months, the ship had been suspected of laying mines in the Gulf. After
determining that crewmen on the deck were dropping objects overboard which appeared to be mines, the order was
given to fire upon the ship. It was left disabled and on fire.
These events illustrate the statutory ambiguity found in the War Powers Resolution. US military forces were not
deliberately or intentionally introduced into hostilities by order of the President until the 21 September attack upon the

Iran Ajr, five months after Kuwait agreed to accept US protection in the Gulf. It can be argued that US forces were
involved in hostilities when the U.S.S. Stark was attacked on 17 May. Yet, even if the attack on the Stark qualified as a
hostile act, it did not activate the War Powers Resolution mechanisms because the President had not intentionally
introduced the Stark into hostilities. And, following the single incident, further hostilities were neither "imminent" nor
"clearly indicated." There was no further order from the President to place more naval vessels in direct confrontation
with potentially hostile forces. The naval vessels, while still in dangerous waters and vulnerable to attack, did not
expect further confrontation and did not intend to initiate any. As a result, even if the 21 September attack on the Iran
Ajr started the 60-day clock, the clock then stopped because the hostilities did not continue.
How does one make sense of these events and square them with the Section 3 and 4 provisions of the War Powers
Resolution? Did the initial introduction of US naval forces into the Persian Gulf require consultation? Did the action
fall into the category of "imminent involvement in hostilities"? Did either the Iraqi attack on the Stark or the firing on
the Iran Ajr start the 60-day clock, and was a report from the President detailing these incidents necessary?
The debates surrounding the drafting and passage of the War Powers Resolution did not anticipate the possibility of a
string of disconnected crises that could, over time, blend into an identifiable, extended conflict. One of the
consequences of this lack of foresight has been the difficulty Congress has faced in determining when consultation and
reporting become mandatory and when the 60-day clock is to be activated. Indeed, Congress had expended as much
debate over this quandary as over the substantive issues surrounding specific military conflicts. Congress has been
long on investigations and hearings and short on resolve in the midst of military action or crisis.[8] Eleven days
following the attack on the Stark, a joint resolution was introduced seeking the start of the 60-day clock. While it could
be argued that Congress knew little more was going to happen militarily in the Persian Gulf, it remains that some
statutory action was necessary if the President was unwilling to bring Congress into the decisionmaking process. The
resolution failed. A month after the Iran Ajr incident, another joint resolution was introduced. This resolution sought to
provide specific authorization under the War Powers Resolution for a continued presence in the Persian Gulf.
Although the term of the proposed authorization was indefinite, it would have required a report from the President
every three months. Despite the benign wording of the resolution, it never emerged from the House Foreign Affairs
and Rules committees.[9]
The intent of the two communication requirements was to bring Congress into the decisionmaking process over the use
of force whenever the circumstances permitted. The hoped-for collective judgment stipulated in the preamble to the
War Powers Resolution was to be achieved by presidential adherence to the provisions detailed in Sections 3 and 4 of
the law. In each instance, according to the resolution, "the President shall" fulfill his obligations. However, the record
of after-the-fact consultation and selective inattention to the written report requirement has brought about a result
neither desired nor envisioned by the proponents of the resolution. Presidents have been given a 90-day carte blanche
to introduce US troops into hostilities without congressional authorization. Rather than check and limit the executive,
the overall structure of the resolution has augmented and enhanced the President's share of the war power.
The intent of the War Powers Resolution was to restore and to ensure collective judgment in using force in foreign
settings. The intentions of the drafters of the resolution were sincere--the law was as much a decisional framework for
Congress as it was for the President. It did not take long, however, for presidential action and assertiveness to take
place--with the acquiescence and consent of the Congress. Missing from this strategy is a Congress fulfilling its
constitutional mandate during the time a military action is taking place. This is not an excuse for Congress to intrude
on the President's power as Commander in Chief, an enumerated power of the President and an area that is off limits to
the reach of Congress.[10] It is, however, a matter of Congress fulfilling its constitutional responsibility, and doing so
at the proper time.
Operations Desert Shield and Storm, 1990-1991: From Delay to Deadline
The 60-day clock provision of the War Powers Resolution, like the consultation and reporting requirement, was meant
to strike a balance between the warmaking functions of each branch, as set forth in the preamble. The idea of balance
can be seen in the recognition by Congress that the President does have some latitude under law to deploy and use
military forces. The main points are found in Section 5:

Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section
4[a](1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with
respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted) unless the Congress (1) has
declared war . . . (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet . . . .
Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President
determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity . . . requires
continued use of such armed forces.[11]
The 60-day clock has been one of the more controversial aspects of the War Powers Resolution. It was eliminated
from the Byrd-Warner bill to amend the resolution in 1988, and it was absent from the National Security Revitalization
Act debated in the House and the Peace Powers Act introduced in the Senate in 1995.[12] Its controversial standing
and its ineffectiveness stem from the expectation that its provisions would trigger automatically, and that Congress
would not need to determine when a report was due and when the clock started ticking. This is not just a technicality.
To declare the clock running is to force the issue of congressional debate and decision. There is a vast difference
between debating when the clock should begin and determining by statute whether to authorize a military operation.
The congressional response to the timing issue has been one of delay and deferment. Congress's focus on legal
procedure at the expense of policy substance neutralizes its response and removes it from the decisionmaking process.
Floor debate may eventually confront and evaluate an action taken or a policy formulated by the President, but such
debate can become moot if it happens close to midnight on the policy clock. The Desert Shield and Desert Storm
debates of 1990 and 1991 illustrate this problem.
On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and presented the United States and its allies with its first post-Cold War
crisis. In November the United Nations Security Council authorized the use of force if Iraq did not withdraw its forces
from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. In the months leading up to the deadline, questions were revived about the power
and prerogative of Congress to wage war. Debate took place in two stages. In October 1990, both chambers of
Congress debated the meaning of the Constitution's warmaking provisions, the powers of the executive and legislative
branches, and the applicability of the War Powers Resolution. No specific decisions were made before Congress
recessed and went home for the holidays in late October. When the members of Congress returned to Washington in
January 1991, the UN deadline was days away. On 8 January, President George Bush called on Congress to exercise
its constitutional responsibility by authorizing military action against Iraq. Three days of long and intense debate
followed, and on 12 January each chamber of Congress held two votes on the proposed military action. The first vote
was on a proposed continuation of sanctions as an alternative to military force. The second sought to authorize use of
force per UN Resolution 678. The second vote passed the House easily, and passed by a much narrower margin in the
Senate. Less than three days before the UN deadline, the Congress of the United States decided to decide.
Three months earlier, on 1 October 1990, House Resolution 658 had been introduced, seeking to support the actions
already taken by the President in the Middle East. Its sponsors pointed out that the resolution was not in conflict with
the War Powers Resolution, since there had been numerous, ongoing meetings in August and September between
House members and committees and the President and his senior advisors. Further, they were careful to show that HR
658 would not become another Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, as it held the President to the use of deterrent force only
and did not grant an open-ended authorization.[13] The call for action on HR 658 reveals a familiar theme:
Thus, the very spirit of War Powers is carried out by virtue of the fact that we bring this resolution to the
floor so members can vote on it . . . or against it--because without that we have nothing.
We would be saying, in effect, "Let the President take the lead and do whatever he wants to; we will sit
back and see which way the wind blows and then decide what we are going to do or how we are going to
do it or what we are going to say about it."[14]
Those opposed to HR 658 did not accept the "take action" challenge. Many who voiced agreement with its substance
nonetheless opposed it because it "fails to meet the very specific requirements set down by the War Powers Act, and
thereby undermines the law."[15] For others, the 9 August 1990 letter from President Bush detailing his actions in
response to the Iraqi invasion did not constitute sufficient reporting. "President Bush should have and should now send

an update." The 60-day clock and timing requirement, which had been absent from the debate until this point, had
been rediscovered--and some believed it was ticking:
We are now within a week of the 60-day limit. Therefore, the War Powers Act requires us to take one of
the specified actions, or the troops must be withdrawn. I believe we should now be voting, not on this
resolution, but on a 60-day extension.[16]
We cannot duck our responsibility. We must demand a 4(a)1 report from the President defining the scope,
the duration, the objectives of our deployment in the gulf, and then we must vote aye or no on the written
record.[17]
After months of extensive communication by the President, and after two months of regular meetings between
congressional members and presidential advisors, some representatives still seemingly lacked enough information to
cast an informed vote. It is not possible to tell from the written record whether the above-quoted Representative
believed that more complete information was lacking, or that he absolutely needed a formal 4(a)1 report from the
President, and that no other form of communication, no matter how plentiful and detailed, would suffice.
The October 1990 debates once again found members of Congress arguing over the fine points of procedure and
interpretation, while seemingly oblivious to the fact that the term specified in the War Powers Resolution was fast
drawing to a close and some affirmative action was expected. The issue of timing occupied the minds of many in these
debates. Yet, the concern was over the President's adherence to the 60-day clock. Had he, in fact, reported? Had the
clock begun?
The House and Senate debates of 10-12 January 1991 concerned the question of congressional authorization versus
continued sanctions. One side argued that extending the deadline meant that Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis could
improve their defenses and become better entrenched in Kuwait. If military action took place at a later date, this delay
would translate into increased American casualties.[18] The opposing side did not rule out the use of force, but
believed that continued sanctions would weaken Iraq's hand. A longer wait, it was thought, would better prepare
coalition forces for warfare in the desert. Underlying this debate was a disquiet about the legitimacy and applicability
of sending US military troops into battle by order of the United Nations.[19] But few members challenged the
legitimacy of Congress in delaying this great debate until the last hour. One exception was Representative Bill Green,
who concluded:
By inserting ourselves into the process at this late date, our ability to participate in a meaningful way is
severely limited and could severely cripple the recently begun process of providing for collective security
through the United Nations . . . .
The 101st Congress, in its waning days, did not lack opportunities to affect this process. By the time we
had adjourned on October 28, 1990, we had approved a defense authorization and appropriations bill that
provided funds for the stationing of troops in the Persian Gulf. Since that deployment had been in
accordance with article 51 of the UN Charter and UN Resolution 655 concerning the naval and maritime
blockade, our vote plainly endorsed that deployment.
I supported those efforts, joining over 400 of my colleagues in approving an additional $978 million for
Persian Gulf related operations.
. . . [B]y waiting until this later hour, we have rendered ourselves extraneous to any positive policy role,
unless we are prepared to try to force a change in the position taken by the United Nations.[20]
This admission highlights Congress's odd treatment of the War Powers Resolution. The weeks of late summer and
early autumn of 1990 showed Congress wrangling over reporting and timing procedure, and delaying debate on the
tough substantive issues surrounding the invasion of Kuwait. Rather than promoting consultation, the War Powers
Resolution helped to delay and inhibit debate and decision. Perhaps Congress might have found a way to push a final
decision to January without recourse to the War Powers Resolution. But the ability to find some other strategy of delay
does not excuse the current one. This episode illustrates the larger theme--the history of the War Powers Resolution

has not been just one of surprises or consequences unintended by its framers. Congress has purposely used the
resolution to offer the show of debate and deliberation, while avoiding engagement with substantive policy. This is not
simply a question of political adaptation. It is a clear demonstration of constitutional abdication.
Kosovo, 1999: Authorize? Declare? Withdraw? Limit?
The Dayton Accords signed in December 1995 began a process that saw more than 16,000 US military troops stationed
in Bosnia by the end of 1996. In the years that followed, Congress was not shy in its criticism and condemnation of
Serbian repression in Kosovo. During 1998, the House and Senate passed resolutions condemning Serbian police
actions in Kosovo, and passed a "sense of the Congress" resolution stating that Slobodan Milosevic was a war crimes
suspect. Further, Congress sought to both involve itself in the ongoing process of peacekeeping and to keep some form
of check upon the President. An amendment to a defense appropriations bill passed in late July barred funding for
further deployment of US troops "unless the President certifies in a report to Congress that such a military presence is
in the national security interest of the United States."[21] In September, a concurrent resolution was passed that called
upon the President to "work with Congress to draft legislation and regulations" to provide monetary compensation for
ethnic Albanian victims from Yugoslavian assets frozen in the United States.[22]
With serious doubts over the potential for success at the peace table, and the possibility of a NATO-led air campaign
against Milosevic and his forces, both chambers of Congress engaged in extensive debates over the scope and limits of
the war power. On 11 March 1999, the House debated House Resolution 103, which set forth the procedural rules for
consideration of House Concurrent Resolution 42, regarding the use of US armed forces as a part of the NATO
peacekeeping operation. The latter resolution, a sense of the Congress measure having no binding effect, was passed
and placed on the Senate calendar. Two weeks later, the Senate debated and passed Senate Concurrent Resolution 21,
which authorized the President to conduct military operations and missile strikes against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. The contexts of each of these early debates are noteworthy. On 11 March, peace negotiations were taking
place and were scheduled to conclude on 15 March. President Clinton had stated that, if needed, US troops could be
deployed within 48 hours of that deadline. The "debate now or debate later" question was clearly troubling to many
members of Congress, and numerous voices questioned the wisdom of passing resolutions while the peace talks were
in progress. On 23 March, the Senate debated the resolution while knowing it was highly likely that missile strikes
would commence the following day. Again, the procedural question of when it is proper to debate and vote
overshadowed the substantive issues of war and peace.
One month into the air campaign, four resolutions were considered in the House. During a marathon day of floor
debate on 28 April, the House voted on proposals that (1) sought to prohibit any allocation of funds for ground troops
without prior congressional authorization, (2) called for the removal of all military forces from their positions in
Yugoslavia, (3) called for a declaration of war against Yugoslavia, and (4) sought to authorize the ongoing military air
operations and missile strikes. Ultimately, the first resolution passed and the next three were defeated. The defeat of
the fourth proposal, Senate Concurrent Resolution 21 (in a 213-213 tie vote), was controversial due to both the mixed
signals that a somewhat suspect tie vote gave and the fact that it removed any affirmative action by Congress over the
month-long military campaign.
All four proposals were rooted in the text and intent of the War Powers Resolution, and the floor debates over each
resolution saw the War Powers Resolution frequently quoted and referenced. On the matter of timing, two important
questions emerged from the proposed resolutions. First, was this a "war" which automatically triggered the procedural
mechanisms of the War Powers Resolution? Second, was the timing of the debates and votes over the specific Kosovo
resolutions appropriate?
A more intriguing part of the congressional response to the Kosovo conflict was the set of resolutions offered by
Representative Tom Campbell. His proposals, the second and third of those debated on 28 April, sought the
withdrawal of all military forces from Yugoslavia "pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution,"[23] and
called for a declaration of war "pursuant to section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution."[24] According to
Representative Campbell, these resolutions conformed to the intent of the War Powers Resolution and provided
avenues for Congress to fulfill its constitutional responsibility. In oft-repeated language during the House debates, one
Representative proclaimed:

Mr. Speaker, the Constitution is very clear. It is the United States Congress which has the power to
determine issues of war and peace and to decide whether our young men and women are put in harm's
way. It is the President who is Commander in Chief of the military; it is Congress which determines
whether we use that military.
It is time now for Congress to stop abrogating its constitutional responsibility to the White House and to
start seriously addressing the issues of war and peace.[25]
The sponsors of these two bills did not expect them to pass. The lopsided margins against the bills (290-139 and 4272, respectively) in some cases did not even receive the sponsors' own votes. Passing the resolutions was not the goal.
Debating and voting on the issues within the 60-day time limit was. Said one proponent of the declaration-of-war
resolution, "Our duty as Congressmen of the United States of America is to uphold the law of the land, and the law of
the land, as passed in 1973 under the War Powers Act, requires this kind of action."[26]
What happened during this day of prolonged argument and debate? For half the day, members of the House debated
resolutions that were seen by some as required by the War Powers Resolution. The unlikely possibilities of immediate
troop withdrawal or moving to a state of war were painstakingly examined, debated, and then defeated. Did that, in
fact, fulfill Congress's constitutional responsibility and representative mandate? A look at the other resolutions
considered on that day points to a different conclusion.
The first resolution--the only one that passed--was anticipatory in nature. If ground troops were to be introduced into
combat, congressional authorization for funding would be needed. Again, many of the proponents of this bill used
familiar language arguing for its passage, stressing that it was "a proper response to where we now find ourselves in
terms of asserting our congressional role under the Constitution, under the War Powers Resolution."[27] However,
when it came to the final bill seeking authorization for the ongoing air campaign, the time to stand up and be counted
resulted in a confusing and unsatisfactory tie vote. Three members who had been on the floor to vote on the first three
bills were mysteriously absent from the final vote tally. Further, one Republican member changed her vote from "aye"
to "nay," turning a slim margin of victory for President Clinton into an odd combination of defeat and stalemate. After
a remarkable day of floor speeches and impassioned debate over congressional responsibility, the final vote--the one
that really mattered--refused to authorize the missile strikes and yet also failed to clearly prohibit or condemn them. In
the end, the House jumped through what it perceived to be the mandatory hoops set out by the War Powers
Resolution--and failed to act. It failed to clearly communicate its will, and it failed to exercise its representative
mandate over matters of war and peace.
A week later, the Senate found a way to table a long-standing bill that would have authorized the deployment of US
armed forces in Yugoslavia. The final decision of the Senate was not to decide. One influential Senator--John McCain-was able to summarize both what had happened in the House and what was about to happen in his own chamber:
Last week, a majority in the other body sent just such [an ambiguous] message to our servicemen and
women, to the American public, and to the world. They voted against the war and against withdrawing our
forces. Such a contradictory position does little credit to Congress. Can we in the Senate not see our duty
a little clearer? Can we not match our deeds to our words?[28]
Apparently not. The vote to table the resolution on the following day provided the answer.
Conclusions: Procedure and Policy
The War Powers Resolution sought to reinsert Congress into the authorization and approval of the use of military
force. It attempted to walk a fine line between the requirements of the Constitution and the political and security
realities of the late 20th century. If the power vested through the appropriations process had passed into an age of
automatic appropriations, then the War Powers Resolution emerged to guarantee after-the-fact control of military
forces once deployed by the President. The intent was that the provisions and mechanisms introduced by the War
Powers Resolution would redress the imbalance of power created by the nuclear age and the "pax americana."
It didn't. And that is the crux of most appraisals of the War Powers Resolution. We contend, however, that the

resolution's departure from its original intent and purpose has not been only a matter of "unintended consequences."
Rather, the resolution has altered legislative and executive relations in ways that have been not only unintended, but
detrimental. Presidents have reshaped the communications requirements to report decisions and actions already taken
and to "go public" on television to solidify popular reaction and support. Congress has condemned this modification of
the consultation and reporting requirements, but has done little to directly challenge it. Presidents have ignored the 60day clock and have asserted their power as Commander in Chief to direct US forces abroad. Congress has condemned
such actions, but has, through delay and deferment, resisted sending legislation to the President for possible veto. It has
not exercised--and has seldom even threatened to exercise--the power of the purse once the President has taken action.
These are procedural issues that point us to a more core constitutional problem: that deference, delay, and lack of
confrontation has substituted alliance with public opinion for fulfilling constitutional responsibilities. John Hart Ely has
concluded that Congress
. . . has left it at simply hemming and hawing, sidetracking resolutions to start the sixty-day clock with
incomprehensible "points of order," passing resolutions to similar but not identical effect in the two houses
and then being "unable" to reconcile them until the war was over, or more often, just doing nothing. Of
course this is just a reversion to pre-resolution form--letting the President initiate military action while
retaining for Congress the options (depending on how the war went) of pointing with pride or viewing
with alarm.[29]
This is not simply a matter of unintended consequences. Congress has adapted itself to the War Powers Resolution and
has found avenues of political benefit by having it available to wave around. The problem is not just that Congress has
failed to discover constitutionally sound ways to fulfill its obligations. Instead, it has ignored and avoided those
options, and substituted less risky alternatives. This has moved Congress from exercising its significant powers during
an event or crisis to waiting to see how the event or crisis plays out. The mechanics of representation--debate,
deliberation, and the passing of laws--have given way to after-the-fact alignment with public opinion. What has been
lost can be called "present situation" action: engaging in debate and making decisions during the time when such
actions are critical and relevant. In one of the most crucial policy areas, the conduct of war and the use of force,
Congress has abdicated its representational duties. And it has been greatly aided and abetted by the War Powers
Resolution of 1973.
So, how should theory translate into policy? What should be done in light of the preceding analysis? Realizing that
policy prescriptions can easily be gathered in the crosshairs of either those who would disagree on practical ("you have
oversimplified the problem") or interpretive ("you have misread the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution")
grounds, we offer the following three proposals.

. First, kick out the crutches: repeal the War Powers Resolution. Many lawmakers and scholars have sought to revise
and refine the War Powers Resolution to achieve collective judgment in matters of use of force. For some, repeal of
the resolution would send the wrong message to an already assertive executive branch. The contention in this regard is
that because the intent of the law was good, there must still be some benefit to keeping the law on the books. We
disagree. Most of those who fear executive usurpation of the war power recognize but do not incorporate congressional
avoidance into their assessments. The feared "green light" for presidential adventurism would start flashing only if the
resolution were to be repealed with no substantive change to follow. Nature abhors a vacuum, and politics abhors a
power vacuum. Congress needs to have something to offer if the resolution is repealed and laid to rest. While repeal
would not guarantee such action, it would certainly take away one of the key impediments to meaningful change.

. Second, count the cost of partnership and reprioritize. One point that must be admitted when surveying the ways in
which Congress has used the War Powers Resolution is that the overall strategy has worked quite well. Congress is not
a chamber of idiots. What has evolved over the past three decades is a strategy for maintaining power while avoiding
the attendant risks of taking a position. If the War Powers Resolution were to be repealed, Congress would soon face a
national security challenge that would require something beyond criticism and problem-avoidance. Simply put,
Congress must place its representative mandate before politics-as-usual. This essay has highlighted just how difficult
such an about-face would be for Congress, but the difficulty of that is exceeded by its necessity. Congress should

either dramatically reprioritize its commitments to foreign policy and military actions abroad or step aside to allow and
admit executive predominance. The structure and text of the Constitution require the first choice. The records of the
1787 Philadelphia convention confirm the need for the representative body to be active in issues of war and peace.
Congressional responsibility is the prerequisite to collective judgment. Artificial mechanisms forcing a written report
or stipulating a set number of days for a military operation have not brought Congress back into the decisionmaking
process. The 27-year record of using the War Powers Resolution as a shield against the need to take action is clear.
The mechanisms provided by the resolution have not, and cannot, substitute for informed debate and principled action.

. Finally, expedited procedures should be tied to statutory action. Many works by practitioners and legal scholars have
called for expedited procedures for congressional decisionmaking. In an article in the Georgetown Law Journal,
Senator Joseph Biden and John Ritch identified the key foreign policy problem of the Cold War era as a presidential
willingness to invoke "emergency powers" in the absence of statutory authorization.[30] Yet, their call for expedited
procedures in debating war powers issues presumes maintenance of the War Powers Resolution framework and allows
specific statutory authorization to be optional, not mandatory.
Unless expedited procedures force Congress to act by joint resolution and require an "up or down vote," Congress will
find new and innovative ways to avoid direct responsibility, and any hope for substantive change will disappear.
Congress most effectively--and constitutionally--involves itself in war powers issues through statutes, through passing
legislation that either prohibits or authorizes presidential actions within a time framework where such actions are
relevant and binding. Acting by statute also allows Congress to confront each action or crisis as a unique event and to
contour its approval or disapproval accordingly. Procedural change that shifts responsibility to a consultative group
does not resolve the issue. In that case the checking and balancing by an engaged Congress is bypassed. Congressional
reassertion through vigorous debate and appropriate legislation is risky, fraught with difficulties, and may even get a
few members booted out of office at the next election. But it remains the sole way in which the intent of the
Constitution as interpreted by the Congress itself--seeking collective judgment in matters involving the use of force-can be fulfilled.
Has Congress gotten what it wanted in 1973? In theory, Congress wanted to restore its role in war powers
decisionmaking. It created legal and procedural mechanisms intended to put its own feet to the fire and force actions
or responses that would ensure collective judgment when American troops are placed in harm's way.
In reality, however, the plan has failed. The artificial provisions and restraints created by the War Powers Resolution
have not fit the post-Vietnam practice of short, easily winnable military actions, peacekeeping efforts, or nationbuilding under the auspices of the United Nations. In practice, the resolution has become something never intended nor
envisioned by its proponents and framers: a shield from and a substitute for substantive action.
Congress has satisfied itself with the show of participation without the attendant political risks. But it has forfeited
something much more significant and essential--the constitutional representative mandate. Restoring that power will
not come through a revival or revision of the War Powers Resolution. Repeal of the resolution must precede any move
of Congress to fulfill its aspiration of bringing collective judgment into issues of war and peace.
NOTES
1. Section 2(a) of the War Powers Resolution states that "this joint resolution [is] to fulfill the intent of the framers of
the Constitution . . . and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities." Even this plain language presents an interpretive problem.
Should this section be read as Congress's desire to accomplish two distinct purposes (e.g. fulfill the intent of the
Constitution's framers and increase the degree of collective judgment regarding overseas military actions)? Or is
Congress just noting that the intention of the framers is to effectuate collective judgment? The canons of statutory
construction do not provide clear guidance, but for our purposes it does not matter what the intentions of the
Constitution's framers were (indeed, there is significant debate over whether Congress's interpretation of the founders'
intention was accurate). What matters is that the War Powers Resolution sets forth a significant expectation that

Congress's role with regard to the engagement of American armed forces would be greater than in the years
immediately preceding. Congress believed that it had lost its voice and wanted to find it again. It is against this
standard that the War Powers Resolution should be assessed.
2. This is open to interpretation. Most writers see the requirements of the War Powers Resolution as interconnected,
and conclude that the report by the President "trips" the clock and the 60-day countdown begins. However, there is
nothing to stop Congress, without the presidential report, from adopting a measure that begins the clock and notifying
the President that the 60-day clock has officially started.
3. This section of the resolution, ostensibly intended to curb short-term presidential adventurism, has been determined
by many to be a legislative veto, and therefore unconstitutional. See the Supreme Court opinion of and extensive
discussion surrounding Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 103 S.Ct. 2764 (1983). In Chadha, the
court ruled that the one-house legislative veto was unconstitutional. The decision was seen as invalidating section 5[c]
of the War Powers Resolution. Scholarship is split over the applicability of Chadha to section 5[c]. It should be noted,
however, that Congress has not followed the direction of the court in the 17 years since the Chadha decision.
Constitutional doctrine has not translated into legislative practice. Justice Byron White's dissent in the case declared
that it sounded the "death knell" for the legislative veto. Such has not been the case. Congress has passed more than
200 new laws containing legislative vetoes since the 1983 decision.
4. War Powers Resolution of 1973, H. J. Res. 542, Public Law 93-148 (1973); 87 Stat. 555, 50 U.S.C. 1541-1548, at
1543.
5. See comments of Representative Toby Roth, Congressional Record, 7 June 1995, pp. H5659-60.
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7. See David L. Hall, The Reagan Wars: A Constitutional Perspective on War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991),
p. 110.
8. Note the hearings held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1988. Occasioned by both the events in the
Persian Gulf in 1987 and the bicentennial of the US Constitution, the war powers hearings produced 1,500 pages of
debate and testimony entitled "The War Power After 200 Years: Congress and the Presidency at a Constitutional
Impasse." Little was discussed in terms of the obligations and involvement of Congress in any specific policy context.
Instead, the hearings revisited the questions of the validity of the War Powers Resolution and the ways in which
presidents have sidestepped its procedural requirements. Some of those who testified had been before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee in the early 1970s making similar, if not identical, claims. (Compare: US Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on War Powers, 14 July 1988; with US
House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "War Powers," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, 7-20 March 1973.)
9. See Hall, pp. 252-62.
10. One of us has written that part of the problem of war powers is in interpreting collective judgment as shared or
concurrent power between the branches in the conduct of military force abroad. It is better viewed as sequenced power,
where each branch exercises power granted in the text of the Constitution at a particular point during the onset and
conduct of war or hostilities. Within this system of sequenced powers, Congress remains preeminent. It is vested with
the power to make laws, and to tax and spend. It thus has the first and last word in the realm of foreign affairs and use
of force. Congress must authorize and vote in appropriations for armed forces before the President, as Commander in
Chief, can contemplate any use of force. And Congress can also remove those forces, either by decommissioning them
or by specifically forbidding their use in a particular setting or circumstance. However, what sits between those two
congressional powers is executive power and initiative. Despite the impressive array of powers granted to Congress,
this view of sequenced power infers that there is something in-between that Congress cannot do. It cannot direct the
forces it has created, acting as a "co-Commander in Chief." (See Timothy S. Boylan, "War Powers, Constitutional
Balance, and the Imperial Presidency Idea at Century's End," Presidential Studies Quarterly, 29 [June 1999], 232-49.)
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decisive effect without the use of force. The best estimates of the CIA indicate that this is not the case. We have
already imposed sanctions for five and one-half months, and we still have no clear timeline or date when we can be
sure that sanctions will change Saddam Hussein's behavior. When will sanctions have enough time? Are we deferring
action, or avoiding it?" Congressional Record, 11 January 1991, p. S230.
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